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In recent years, a net migration rate close to zero between the United States (U.S.) and Mexico has made 
headlines (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012). Several factors have contributed to this dramatic 
change in migration patterns: following the tightening of migration restrictions in the north and changing 
demographic trends in Mexico, emigration rates have fallen considerably. At the same time, the Great 
Recession in the U.S. has sent many Mexican migrants back home and deterred many others from 
undertaking the journey to the U.S. While the literature exploring the political consequences of emigration 
in sending countries is booming, hardly any research exists on what the return of migrants “with 
augmented human capital, financial capital (savings), foreign connections, ideas, and, perhaps critically, 
changed expectations” (Kapur 2014, 486) may imply for the outlook of new democracies. We start to 
unpack this black box by studying the impact of return migration on electoral participation.  
Limited scholarly research has shown that return migrants, especially returnees coming back from 
advanced polities, may be drivers of democratic change by disseminating their views about democratic 
governance and political accountability learned abroad (Levitt 1998; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; 
Chauvet and Mercier 2014; Batista and Vicente 2011; Tuccio, Wahba, and Hamdouch 2019). However, 
some authors remain sceptical about the long-lasting effect of returnees in enhancing the democratic life of 
the localities to which they return (Pérez-Armendáriz 2014). Research on Mexico has shown that returnees 
tend to disengage from politics shortly after their arrival, in part as a reaction to the ill-will of non-migrant 
co-nationals, who find returnees too “dissimilar” to be valuable role models (Fitzgerald 2013; Pérez-
Armendáriz 2014, 82). In this paper, we offer a systematic test of these alternative views by looking at 
electoral turnout in presidential elections in Mexico.   
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The increasing flows of return migrants have taken place against a worsening of the security 
situation, particularly after 2006. According to theories of return migration, the impact that returnees may 
have in their communities is, among other factors, contingent on the context they encounter upon return 
(Cassarino 2004, 257). Several authors have reported a negative effect of high levels of homicide rates and 
organised violence by criminal organisations on the likelihood of showing up to vote on election day 
(Trelles and Carreras 2012a; Ley 2018). We argue that some of the mechanisms by which return migration 
may enhance political engagement are less likely to play out in the context of low confidence in a state 
incapable of protecting its citizens. We exploit the heterogeneity in crime rates and incidence of drug-
related violence to explore the impact that this violent context may have had on returnees’ and non-migrant 
co-nationals’ propensity to vote.  
We deepen and expand recent research (Duquette-Rury and Chen 2018) by using data on local 
electoral participation in presidential elections over the period 2000–2012. Our research shows that 
electoral turnout in municipalities with high rates of return migration is, on average, lower. Moreover, the 
negative effect of return migration on electoral participation is exacerbated in settings where crime is 
rampant. This suggests that returnees’ electoral alienation is shaped in part by the context of insecurity they 
encounter in the communities they return to. Our work contributes to an incipient research agenda on the 
political impact of return migration, the evolution of transnational political engagement in so-called violent 
democracies (Pérez-Armendáriz 2019), and the broader debate on the role of migrants as agents of 
democratic deepening. 
On methodological grounds, our research faces the challenge that return migration is endogenous to 
election outcomes, leading to biased estimates. On the one hand, politics might drive migration decisions, 
provoking selection bias among the migrant population. On the other hand, economics drives both politics 
and migration, potentially causing omitted variable bias. We therefore implement an instrumental variable 
strategy in which we explain the rates of return migration at the municipal level as resulting from 
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exogenous U.S. labour market shocks in a first step, and then use predicted rates of return migration to 
explain voter turnout in a second step. 
The paper proceeds as follows: in the first section, we describe the changing context of return 
migration during this period. Next, we discuss the literature on return migration and politics, showing the 
existence of a large gap when it comes to understanding the impact of return migration on political 
behaviour. We propose several mechanisms by which rates of return migration may affect electoral 
participation and establish how these mechanisms may impact returnees’ and non-migrant co-nationals’ 
propensity to vote. In the third section, we discuss our data and methods. In Section Four we present the 
results. Finally, we conclude in Section Five with reflections and suggestions for future research. 
1. The Changing Character and Context of Return Migration 
During our period of study (2000–2012), there have been several forces affecting migration flows that we 
need to consider. Lower fertility rates, a major economic recession in the U.S., and a tightening of border 
policies have had a substantial effect on economic migration from Mexico to the U.S. (Passel, Cohn, and 
Gonzalez-Barrera 2012, 6; Masferrer and Roberts 2012, 466). The other major societal and political change 
that took place over our period of research was a dramatic worsening of the security situation (Pansters 
2018). We argue that these two phenomena have caused a negative selection in return migration and a 
challenging context in home communities for returnees to exert an efficacious role as agents of democratic 
change.   
Return migration figures, while patchy and scattered, give an unequivocal picture of increasing 
return migration flows. The 2010 Mexican census shows that the absolute number of individuals whose 
residence in 2005 was in the U.S. increased threefold between those two years (Masferrer and Roberts 
2012, 473; Montoya-Ortiz and González-Becerril 2015). To give a sense of the magnitude of the return, in 
terms of proportions, “the 2010 census showed that nearly one in three (31%) of those who had left for the 
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U.S. within the previous five years had returned. That compares with about one in six (17%) for those who 
had left for the U.S. within the five years prior to the 2000 Mexican census” (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-
Barrera 2012, 15). The Centre for Migratory Studies at the National Institute of Migration reports a 
constant return of Mexican migrants estimated at 400 thousand migrants annually (García-Zamora 2014, 
41). It is not surprising that net migration figures have been close to zero in recent times (BBVA Bancomer 
2015).  
Regarding the characteristics of migrants and their selectivity into return migration, it is frequently 
mentioned that a majority of Mexican returnees came back voluntarily (Moctezuma 2013, 153). Between 
2005 and 2010, the percentage of returnees who were voluntary, often moving back with their families, 
varied between 65% and 95% (Passel et al. 2012 citing Pew Hispanic research, 22). However, as the broad 
range of these estimates suggests, judging the voluntary character of return is often problematic (Hazan 
2014, 5) 1: describing as voluntary returns that very often are motivated by “limited opportunities for 
school or work, (…) chronic anxiety, or (…) a family member’s deportation” may indeed be a stretch 
(Silver 2018, 209). Also, in this period, deportations have taken place in record numbers. According to 
Denier and Masferrer (2019), and citing data from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), around 
1.5 million Mexican nationals were removed during the Bush administration (2000–2008) and close to 2 
million were deported during the Obama administration (2009–2016). Montoya-Ortiz and González-
Becerril (2015, 64) report that between 2005 and 2010, deportees amounted to 11% of total returns.2  
 
1 https://ccis.uscd.edu/_files/wp193.pdf (accessed 25 April, 2019) 
2 Citing Cantor (2014), “Nuevo estudio revela causas de migración de retorno a México.” 
http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/01/15/nuevo-estudio-revela-causas-de-migracion-de-retorno-a-mexico/ 
(accessed 30 May, 2019). 
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The demographic profile of recent Mexican returnees has changed, with a predominance of married 
male young adults with elementary education levels and coming from rural areas rather than the well-off, 
highly educated retiree immigrants that characterised return migration in the past. Returnees are going back 
to states that historically had high levels of migration. Up to 80% return to their states of origin 
(Moctezuma 2013; López 2018, 23).3 And while most of these returnees find formal employment relatively 
quickly after they return, a majority of these, in turn, end up in low-paid jobs, disproportionally in the 
agricultural sector (Li Ng, Salgado, and Serrano 2016; Hazan 2014). Compared to previous decades, 
returnees had become less positively selected in terms of education and wages in 2010 (Campos-Vazquez 
and Lara 2012). Returnees’ engagement in entrepreneurial activities is also less than in the past (Denier 
and Masferrer 2019; Parrado and Gutiérrez 2016).  
Changing political and economic circumstances in the U.S. hit immigrants who were in a more 
vulnerable position badly: undocumented migrants and those with shorter stays in the U.S, who lacked 
solid networks to rely on (Hazan 2014, 17). As Hazan (2014) found in her study on return migration in 
Jalisco, the tightening of enforcement and immigration policies together with an acute economic recession 
in the U.S. “[broke] families apart, weakened social safety nets, expanded the sense of nostalgia and 
homesickness, and increased the obstacles for migrants to find jobs in an already difficult economic 
scenario.” 4 The non-voluntary character (whether forcible or not) of return meant that returnees were 
unprepared to make the move. Under these circumstances, returnees’ capacity to mobilise the savings, 
 
3 Masferrer and Roberts (2012, 469-70) find that return to places other than those of birth was estimated as 
making up a quarter of returns. 
4 Her study is based on a survey of 601 return migrants to Jalisco. The survey was carried out between 2 
May and 6 June, 2013. 
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contacts, and experience necessary to exert an impact in their communities of origin may have been limited 
(Cassarino 2004; Masferrer and Roberts 2012; Parrado and Gutiérrez 2016; Denier and Masferrer 2019).  
Concerning the context returnees encountered upon return, prominently after 2006, Mexico became 
the epitome of a violent democracy; that is, a governing system “in which competitive elections, civil 
freedoms, and inclusive participation have taken root yet the state does not control sub-state violence” 
(Pérez-Armendáriz 2019, 2). Although violence in Mexico has deep historical roots that reach back far 
beyond the most recent wave of drug-related criminality (Pansters 2018), we focus on the escalation of 
violence during Felipe Calderón’s administration (2006–2012). Mexican cartels have been active in 
trafficking marijuana and poppy for over a century. Several cartels have dominated the criminal scene; the 
Tijuana, Juárez, Sinaloa, and Gulf cartels. These cartels co-existed relatively peacefully, but by the mid-
1990s, processes of subnational democratisation and the transition to a multiparty democracy had left the 
cartels on their own in terms of regulating the drug industry. Lacking the government protection they had 
previously enjoyed, the cartels went to war, resulting in a dramatic escalation of drug-related crimes 
(Meseguer, Ley, and Ibarra-Olivo 2017, 2173-4; Trejo and Ley 2018; Shirk and Wallman 2015; Pansters 
2018; Rios 2015). When Calderón took office following a contested election, he made the fight against 
drug violence the cornerstone of his mandate. Calderón decided to fight organised crime by militarising the 
conflict, capturing and killing the leaders of these organisations. The side effect of this strategy was a 
worsening of the situation as cartels fought internally and between each other to control the industry and 
defend their territories. The number of different cartels rose, causing generalised violence at the local level 
(Shirk and Wallman 2015; Guerrero 2010; Calderón et al. 2015).  
Importantly, the wave of return migration we look at took place against the background of the failed 
migration strategy under the two subsequent PAN (Partido de Acción Nacional) presidencies. Vicente Fox 
(2000–2006) started his mandate with high ambitions of reaching a grand bilateral agreement with 
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Mexico’s northern neighbour.5 However, negotiations came to a halt in 2001 following the September 11 
events. Despite multiple initiatives to reach out and engage Mexicans abroad,6 the criminalisation of 
migration and the adoption of highly restrictive policies in the U.S. increased the perception that Fox’s 
administration failed to enhance the status and rights of Mexican migrants. While U.S. discourse on 
migration became tougher, and protests among the migrant community in the U.S. mounted, Felipe 
Calderón (2006–2012) pushed migration downward in the bilateral agenda to prioritise the fight against 
criminal organisations. During his presidency, when migration entered the political scene, it was frequently 
linked to a deteriorating security situation. Paradoxically, irregular migrants were often portrayed as the 
main threat to border security, while in parallel they became frequent targets and victims of criminal 
organisations in their journeys to the U.S. (Orozco-Aleman and Gonzalez-Lozano 2018, 718). As Durand 
put it, “the general perception is that President Calderón abandoned migrants” (2013, 767).7 Felipe 
Calderón’s party lost the 2012 presidential election to the opposition candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto 
(Partido Revolucionario Institucional).  
 
5 The “whole enchilada”, as it was popularly referred to in the media, included among other measures a 
process for regularization of migrants in the U.S., a new temporary worker agreement, better border 
security, and development initiatives in out-migration areas (Délano 2012, 45).  
6 Probably the most remarkable development in this regard was the recognition of voting rights for 
emigrants in the 2006 federal election for the first time. However, participation was extremely low. 
Scholars attribute this fact to high bureaucratic barriers to casting a vote, low political engagement prior to 
departure, relatively short stays in the destination, low socioeconomic status, and lack of solid social 
networks while abroad. All these factors negatively affect migrants’ capacity to acquire new political 
capital that can subsequently be imported (Waldinger and Soehl 2013; Wals 2013; McCann, Cornelius, and 
Leal 2009).  
7 Authors’ translation. 
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Given these parallel demographic, societal, and political dynamics, the lack of research exploring 
how increasing return flows to violent settings might have affected electoral engagement is surprising. 
Because of the centrality and the visibility of the Mexican president in the design of migratory and security 
policies, and in Mexican politics in general, we consider it vital to study the effect of return migration on 
electoral participation in presidential elections.8  
2. Return Migration and Political Engagement in a Violent Democracy 
Research on the political consequences of international migration for sending countries is rapidly 
expanding (Kapur 2010, 2014). The question motivating this growing research agenda is: Do migrants 
remit democratic practices (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; Pfutze 2012)? Several results seem robust. 
Émigrés transmit democratic values and practices, but apparently only if they settle down in countries with 
good governance and working democratic institutions (Spilimbergo 2009; Córdova and Hiskey 2015; 
Maydom 2017). Exposure of those left behind to emigrants’ ideas increases non-electoral political 
participation (Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; Germano 2013; Córdova and 
Hiskey 2015). There also seems to be evidence of attitudinal changes, such as more support for democracy 
in general, but a more critical stance with respect to how democracy works in the home country (Bravo 
2009; Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; Córdova and Hiskey 2015).  
While the so-called diaspora channel – that is, the influence of emigrants in home countries from 
abroad – is being thoroughly researched, we know very little about the impact that return migrants have on 
the political life of their communities following their return. We agree with Kapur and McHale (2012) in 
 
8 As a persistent feature of Mexican politics, analysts point to the relative irrelevance of political parties in 
comparison to presidential candidates in presidential elections (Bruhn 2015, 47). Yet the consequences of 
security and migration policies are most evident at the community level and therefore, for robustness, we 
show how return migration affects turnout in municipal elections in the Supplementary Appendix. 
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that return migration is the least explored channel of migrants’ political impact. The literature on social 
remittances – the “ideas, behaviours, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving to sending 
country communities” (Levitt, 1998: 927) – is of relevance in this exploration because returnees exert 
influence in their communities through the values, norms, practices, and resources they acquire abroad and 
bring back home with them (Levitt 1998; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 
2011).9 In what follows, we distinguish the conditions that in our view affect the capacity and willingness 
of returnees to engage in electoral politics from those that may shape the receptivity of non-migrant co-
nationals to returnees’ social remittances. We further discuss how a context of crime may impair the 
diffusion of social remittances and affect electoral turnout.  
The list of empirical works on the political consequences of return migration is not long. In the 
optimistic camp, Batista and Vicente (2011) found that a higher proportion of return migrants in Cape 
Verde localities increased the demands for greater accountability. Mercier and Chauvet (2014) used census 
data and the election results for the 2009 municipal elections in Mali and found a positive impact of 
returnees coming back from different destinations on turnout. Tuccio et al. (2019) show that return 
migration increased the demand for social and political change, as well as electoral turnout in the 2011 
parliamentary elections in Morocco. In all these case studies, positive effects on accountability and turnout 
are associated with the presence of return migrants coming back from Western Europe (but not from other 
destinations), arguably having been exposed to better functioning political institutions. In Mexico, Waddell 
and Fontenla’s (2015) study of return migration to the state of Guanajuato shows a positive effect of 
returnees on health, education, income, and political participation in their communities. In sum, in these 
 
9 While there is research on the economic impact that returnees have in their communities (Mercier and 




studies, migrants returning from better functioning polities acquired social capital that translated into more 
electoral engagement in home communities. 
In the pessimistic camp, studying Mexico, Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow (2010) found that returnees 
are not more likely than non-migrants to participate in protests, join civic organizations, or engage in non-
electoral forms of political participation. Detailed exploration of the political effects of distant contact with 
emigrant relatives vs. face-to-face contact with returnees from the U.S. in the Mexican context reveals a 
mixed picture. Based on interviews with emigrants, non-migrants, and returnees, Pérez-Armendáriz (2014) 
found, first, that the asymmetry of power that generates pride and admiration vanishes once the relative 
comes back, detracting from their power as transmitters of social remittances. Second, returnees are often 
perceived by non-migrants as dissimilar and disconnected from the reality to which they return (Fitzgerald 
2013). Partly due to this lack of a good reception, returnees try, but soon lose their interest in driving 
change in their communities (Pérez-Armendáriz 2014, 78). In her detailed account, non-migrant co-
nationals appear to be an important factor deterring returnees from exerting change in their communities. 
More recently, Duquette-Rury and Chen (2018) found that return migration decreased turnout in municipal 
elections by 4–5 percent. 
 Note, then, that these contradictory findings make it necessary to think systematically about the 
conditions under which a positive political impact of return is more likely. In our view, returning migrants 
must have had, first, a quality stay in the destination (in terms of time and integration in the host society) in 
order to learn the benefits of political participation and good governance. Once back home, returnees have 
to be motivated to spread their acquired social and political capital through their regular contact with non-
migrants, or by taking over leadership roles in their communities. Second, non-migrant co-nationals must 
be receptive to these imported social remittances. We argue that these conditions are not exclusive and that 




To begin, rather than being the end of a natural migration cycle, the return stream we explore 
resulted from an economic recession and the implementation of tougher immigration and border 
enforcement measures. As Hazan puts it, these returnees were more likely to belong to “a fairly 
disempowered population in the U.S.” (Hazan 2014, 38–39).10 Many left the U.S. without having had the 
time to augment their financial resources or to integrate in the destination. For example, the returnees 
interviewed in Hazan’s study barely participated in civic organisations or took part in Home Town 
Associations (HTAs) while abroad. Besides exposing them to greater vulnerability amidst increasing 
adverse economic conditions and anti-immigrant policies in the U.S., low levels of social connectivity in 
the destination implied limited opportunities for migrants to increase their social capital and learn from 
democratic practices in the destination (Waldinger and Soehl 2013). To a large extent, return was 
unprepared and unwanted, making reintegration challenging (Masferrer and Roberts 2012, 472; Parrado 
and Gutiérrez 2016). Consequently, the motivation to exert the role of “agents of change” through electoral 
engagement is likely low, especially when returnees contemplate re-emigration (Martínez, Slack, and 
Martinez-Schuldt 2018). Narrowed exit options may further depress the sense of belonging and moral 
obligation to contribute to the betterment of their communities, undermining returnees’ sense of public 
duty. All these variables negatively affect the value attributed to the act of showing up to vote.  
On the part of non-migrant co-nationals, for social remittances to spread, non-migrant co-nationals 
need to regard returnees as valid interlocutors and worthy role models. However, non-migrant co-nationals 
and families with returnees frequently find that “returnees do not adapt well to living with the family 
again” (Pérez-Armendáriz 2014, 82). Returnees are often a source of “more problems than benefits” 
(Pérez-Armendáriz 2014, 82). This in turn undermines social cohesion in their communities. Moreover, the 
utilitarian value of having an émigré relative abroad disappears with return (Pérez-Armendáriz 2014, 85), 
 
10 In Hazan’s study, the percentage of undocumented returnees is high: 73% (Hazan 2014, 27) 
https://ccis.ucsd.edu/_files/wp193.pdf (accessed 25 April, 2019) 
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the more so if the return was involuntary, with little financial resources, and under the stigma of failure. 
The kind of ill-will and feelings of dissimilarity returnees often encounter feeds on their perception of 
political efficacy and may deteriorate even further their motivation to engage in electoral politics.  
How may a context of insecurity and rampant violence affect the conditions for returnees and non-
migrant co-nationals to participate in elections?11 Scholars of Mexican politics have reported that crime has 
a negative impact on the confidence and support that citizens have for political systems and institutions in a 
context where states appear incapable of protecting their citizens. The presence of criminal organisations 
during elections alters the perception that individuals have of the ability of their vote to make a difference 
(Ley 2018, 1968). Citizens choose to retreat from the public to a “private sphere”, which decreases their 
probability of participating in elections (Trelles and Carreras 2012a, 101). This context may certainly not 
be the best for social remittances brought back by returnees to kick in. In particular, we anticipate that 
crime and the failed political response to it, together with the criminalisation of migration, may exacerbate 
both returnees’ unwillingness to engage in politics and non-migrants’ disdain towards returnees, causing 
widespread political disenchantment.  
On the part of returnees, research has shown that they tend to make harsher evaluations of 
government performance than do non-migrants (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; Kessler and Rother, 
2016.). As Jiménez reports in his research, those that have lived abroad “are far more likely to be 
dissatisfied with Mexican institutions” (Jiménez 2008, 29). Returning to largely faulty local polities where 
trust in the efficacy of political parties is low due to pervasive violence, returnees are unlikely to consider 
 
11 While some authors have shown that variables such as political alternation, federal structures, party label 
in power, or past history of social mobilisation has an effect on crime incidence (Trejo and Ley 2018; Ley, 
Mattiace, and Trejo 2019), we are not aware of any work showing that electoral turnout affects criminal 
violence in Mexico. 
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formal political participation an effective way to keep politicians accountable. The political context 
described above in which migrants felt sidelined in the presidential agenda, and were frequently victimised 
and criminalised, must have deepened returnees’ suspicion of the political class. Moreover, insecurity is a 
strong push factor behind emigration decisions. It makes sense to expect that migrants involuntary 
returning to areas “ravaged by conflict” and lacking opportunities to live safe lives will likely find 
readjustment challenging and therefore consider re-emigration (J. T. Hiskey et al. 2018; Orozco-Aleman 
and Gonzalez-Lozano 2018; Scarnato 2019, 199). Consequently, we expect (mostly involuntary) returnees 
to have even less incentive to participate formally in politics in communities where violence is pervasive.   
On the part of non-migrant co-nationals, the deterioration of interpersonal trust and trust in political 
institutions associated with a surge in crime (Trelles and Carreras 2012; Ley 2018; Blanco 2013) may 
increase the perception that return migrants are coming back “transformed” in a negative way, and import 
cultures of crime and violence (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011, 19; Fitzgerald 2013). Recent returnees 
have often been stigmatised as “social outsiders” or, even worse, as “criminal deportees” (Silver 2018, 209; 
Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011, 19; Fitzgerald 2013, 119; Scarnato 2019). Evidence connecting crime and 
return migration is inconclusive, though. For instance, Bucheli et al. (2019) found that return migration 
may have a pacifying effect, reducing the number of homicides in Mexico, while Blake (2014) and 
Ambrosius and Leblang (2018) found the opposite in cross-country samples for the specific case of 
deported convicts. Research is too incipient to have reached a consensus on the effect of return migration 
on violence in origin countries. Yet the portrayal of returnees, and in particular deportees, in the media and 
political discourse as “presumed criminals” (Scarnato 2019, 197) may deepen non-migrant co-nationals’ 
misgivings towards returnees, damaging local social networks, and pushing non-migrants further away 
from participating in elections. Note that feedback dynamics of this type imply that the impact return 
migration may have on electoral engagement may transcend returnees’ electoral apathy. When returnees 
are perceived as a threat or burden, such perception may cause negative spillover effects by affecting levels 
of interpersonal trust and trust in political institutions (that is, communities’ social capital), which in turn 
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may impact electoral participation at the community level. If the impact that return migration has on 
turnout clearly exceeds rates of return migration, we can interpret this as evidence that spillover effects are 
indeed operating.   
In sum, in view of the above discussion, we expect recent return migration into Mexico to be 
associated with a decrease in electoral engagement. Further, we expect this effect to be magnified in the 
presence of criminal violence. We test these propositions next. 
3. Data and Method 
We estimate the effect of return migration as captured in census data (2000, 2005, and 2010) on 
electoral turnout for presidential elections in the years 2000, 2006, and 2012. For robustness, we also test 
the effect of return migration on turnout during municipal elections, which take place every three years in a 
staggered election calendar (see Supplementary Appendix Table S2).12 The main explanatory variable is 
return migration (Return) over the previous five years, measured as the share of population that resided in a 
different country five years ago.13 The fact that the average share of return migrants across all 
municipalities increased substantially from 2005 to 2010 (0.4% to 1.5%) underlines the strong effect of the 
U.S. recession on return migration. 
 
12 For turnout in municipal elections, we use elections held in the current census year or the most recently 
held election in either 𝑡 − 1 or 𝑡 − 2. Data for local elections comes from CIDAC (Centro de Investigación 
para el Desarrollo). 
13 Since turnout statistics for presidential elections are based on registered voters only, the effect of return 
on abstention rates should not be affected by recent returnees, who might not appear in electoral registries. 
For local elections (as reported in the Supplementary Appendix S2), we lack election registries and use the 
adult population as a second-best denominator to calculate turnout rates. 
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 The principal methodological challenge lies in the fact that return migration is endogenous to 
election outcomes, leading to biased estimates. On the one hand, politics might drive migration decisions, 
provoking selection bias among the migrant population. On the other hand, economics drives both politics 
and migration, potentially causing omitted variable bias. We therefore implement an instrumental variable 
strategy in which we explain the rates of return migration at the municipal level as a result of exogenous 
U.S. labour market shocks in a first step. We exploit variation in migrants’ exposure to U.S. labour market 
conditions in the U.S. in the instrumental strategy. Historically, a number of different migration corridors 
emerged between origin regions in Mexico and destinations in the U.S. Due to network effects that reduce 
the costs of migration, these migration corridors exhibit strong path dependencies, and change only slowly 
over time (McKenzie and Rapoport 2007). For example, migration networks in the northern states date 
back to the recruitment of Mexican labour for railway construction in the 1920s, and later the ‘bracero’ 
program of labour recruitment in the 1950s and 1960s. In contrast, migration networks that emerged in 
central and southern states have a more recent origin, registering strong outward movements in the 1990s 
and 2000s in the context of structural changes within the Mexican agricultural sector (cp. Durand, Massey, 
and Parrado 1999). Different migration corridors have led to variation in exposure to U.S. labour market 
conditions between Mexican states, depending on the distribution of the Mexican diaspora across U.S. 
states. As a result, Mexican states with a larger share of migrants in U.S. states and that experienced strong 
increases in unemployment also received a higher influx of returning migrants.  
 To capture regional exposure to U.S. labour market conditions, we construct an indicator over the 
previous three years by subtracting the level of unemployment in U.S. state k in year t-3 from the level of 
unemployment in U.S. state k in year t. In order to generate variation by Mexican state, job creation in U.S. 
states is multiplied by the percentage of consular documents (matrículas consulares) that have been 
requested by individuals from Mexican state j who lived in U.S. state k. Data on migration corridors comes 
from the cumulative number of consular documents issued by the Mexican government to nationals 
abroad, independently of their migration status) up to the year 2008 (Instituto de Mexicanos en el Exterior, 
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IME, 2008). Note that the IME (2008) data is intentionally left without variation so that all time variation 
in the variable is due to fluctuations in job creation and not to changes in migration patterns. In order to 
obtain municipality level variation and to increase the strength of the instrument, we multiply the value of 
this indicator by two other variables often used as instruments in the literature (e.g., Pfutze 2012; 
McKenzie and Rapoport 2007; Woodruff and Zenteno 2007; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2011): distance to the 
U.S. border along historical rail lines (distance from the municipality to the closest rail lines as they existed 
in 1920 and from there to the U.S. border), and the historical migration rates at the state level in the year 
1924 (both variables from Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2011). The rationale for the distance variable is that 
migration corridors today have their roots in the recruitment of Mexican labour along rail lines during the 
Bracero guest worker program (López Córdova 2005; Woodruff and Zenteno 2007). These historical roots 
of migration routes persist even today (Woodruff 2007; McKenzie and Rapoport 2007). For a similar 
reason, we give a stronger weight to unemployment shocks in states that are characterised by historically 
high migration rates as measured in 1924. While historical migration affects the intensity of migration rates 
today through path-dependencies and network effects, we do not expect these factors to affect changes in 
voter turnout over the years 2000 to 2012. Note that the identification information comes from time-
varying U.S. labour market shocks, whereas time-constant variables provide different weights to 
unemployment shocks at the state and municipal levels. We call the instrumental variable Usempl and fit 
the following model at the municipal level: 
(Eq. 1) 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜈𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(Eq. 2) 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽4 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛̂ 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜈𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
 In the first regression step, 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the share of return migrants in municipality 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 
explained by an increase in the instrument 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙 (changes in unemployment rates over the previous 
three years in U.S. states where Mexican migrants live) as explained above. X is a vector of control 
variables. The β are the estimated coefficients, 𝑢 is the error term, and ν is a municipality fixed effect 
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that controls for all time-invariant unobserved factors at the level of municipalities. In the second 
regression step (2), Turnouti,t refers to the election outcome in municipality i at time t, and 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛̂ i,t are 
the estimates from the first step equation (1). The regressions use data from up to 2,125 municipalities for 
which data on turnout are available, return migration, and control variables for at least two periods (out of a 
total of 2,456 municipalities).14   
 The exogeneity of the instrument is satisfied as long as regional variation in U.S. labour market 
conditions does not have an effect on variation in election outcomes in Mexico other than through the 
migration channel. There are several potential concerns with respect to instrument exogeneity. First, labour 
market shocks at destination may affect migratory routes as well as selection into migration (Orrenius and 
Zavodny 2005; Fajardo, Gutiérrez, and Larreguy 2017). The effect of labour market shocks on migration 
decisions could therefore be reflected in the requests for consular documents, hence biasing our estimate of 
exposure to unemployment shocks at destination. In that case, the instrumental variable would partly 
measure migration responses to changes in unemployment increases at destination rather than the effect of 
the shock itself.  To address this concern, we measure migration corridors as the cumulative count of 
document requests up to 2008, the year when the U.S. financial crisis affected labour markets (our main 
exogenous shock). Hence, unemployment shocks in the context of the U.S. financial crisis are excluded 
from our measure of migration corridors. Also, crime may be a cause of international displacements. The 
instrumented interaction would be biased if the weights used for creating the instrumental variable are 
themselves affected by crime in Mexican states. However, the security situation deteriorated around 2008 
 
14 The drop in observations in the estimations for municipal turnout (See Appendix S2) is mostly due to 
limited data for the state of Oaxaca with its 570 municipalities. Return data for the year 2000 are not 
available for most of the smaller municipalities of the state of Oaxaca. Moreover, the state of Oaxaca does 
not hold party-based local elections, but is governed according to local traditions (usos y costumbres). The 
sample is further reduced due to limited data availability on some covariates.  
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or only shortly before (Shirk and Wallman 2015), while the overwhelming number of matrículas were 
handed out to people who had emigrated before that year. Importantly, municipality fixed effects control 
for all time-constant characteristics that might be related to patterns of self-selection into either emigration 
or return migration, including institutional legacies, historical migration patterns, and geographical 
differences. Hence, the instrument builds entirely on regional variation in labour markets across U.S. 
states, which is plausibly unrelated to regional variation in electoral participation in Mexico. A second 
concern is that U.S. unemployment shocks may possibly affect economic conditions in Mexico through 
channels other than migration that may also be related to turnout during elections; for instance, trade links. 
If trade occurs along migration routes, this could pose a threat to identification. To account for this, we 
include a number of state and municipal controls that reflect sub-national economic conditions. Finally, 
besides return migration, U.S. unemployment shocks affect other migration variables, in particular out-
migration, as well as the flow of remittances. These flows have been related to electoral engagement 
(Bravo 2009; Ebeke and Yogo 2013; Dionne, Inman, and Montinola 2014; Duquette-Rury and Chen 2018). 
To account for this, we provide regression results that explicitly control for emigration rates and 
remittances and for indirect socioeconomic outcomes of remittances. This being said, the instrument likely 
captures other dimensions of migration too. Return migration rates should therefore be understood as an 
observable measure of a broader migration shock that typically goes hand in hand with lower emigration 
rates and changes in remittance flows. 
 A number of additional socioeconomic controls are included in the models, both at the municipal 
and at the state level. Control variables refer to the years 2000, 2005, and 2010 for which census data and 
population count data are available. Population (log) measures municipal population size. An aggregate 
index of poverty available in the Mexican census (Marginality) combines information on literacy rates, 
income levels, and social infrastructure in each municipality. Male refers to the share of households headed 
by males. The age of the household head (Age) serves as an indicator of demographic composition. The 
variable Indigenous indicates whether an indigenous language was spoken in the household. Education is 
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the average number of years of schooling of household heads in the municipality. GDPShare is the 
respective state’s share of Mexican GDP, and GDPPC measures per capita GDP at the Mexican state level. 
Homicides are annual homicides per 100,000 persons at the level of municipalities. The expectation 
concerning these variables is that deprivation stifles electoral participation. From Ley (2018) we take two 
indicators of the competitiveness of elections: the effective number of parties (Enp) and the margin of 
victory (Margin). We expect that turnout will increase in competitive settings. We also control for the party 
in power at the state level and the vote share of each of the main parties during presidential elections.15 See 
Table A1 in the Appendix for a description of all variables and sources. 
 In addition to testing an average effect of return migration on electoral engagement, we explore 
whether a context of crime further affects rates of political participation in presidential elections. 
According to our hypothesis, we expect that violence will magnify the negative effect of return migration 
on electoral turnout. As explained, in the context where distrust toward the political system is the norm, 
returnees may be even more unmotivated to exert any political leadership, at least as reflected in greater 
electoral participation. To test this proposition, we interact return migration with the level of violence in 
municipality 𝑖 at time 𝑡, using the interaction between Usempl and indicators of violence as an instrument 
for the interaction term. We use three alternative variables to measure the presence of crime: a binary 
variable for the presence of drug cartels in the municipalities (Cartels), the number of cartels in a 
municipality (Nr. Cartels), and drug-related sentences (Sentenced), all taken from Ríos and Coscia (2012).   
 
15 For local elections (reported in the Supplementary Appendix Table S2), we control for the vote share of 
each of the main parties either alone or in coalition during the latest local elections. The variable Last 
Election counts the number of years since the last municipal election took place, in order to account for 
variation in election cycles. 
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 As mentioned, crime rates may not be exogenous to return migration, although the direction of the 
relationship is debated (Bucheli et al 2019; Blake 2014; Ambrosius and Leblang 2018). If this is the case, 
the coefficient of the interaction between return migration and crime might be biased. While drug cartels 
are related to rising crime in Mexico over the period under study, it is unlikely that the rate of return 
migration had a causal effect on the presence of drug cartels, since the latter has far deeper long term 
structural and political roots (Pansters 2018). We therefore see endogeneity as less of a concern if we use 
variables related to the presence of cartels.  
4. Results 
Our results give support to our stated hypothesis: Return migration depresses electoral turnout in 
presidential elections, and this effect is stronger in high crime contexts. Table 1 shows first and second step 
results for our main model. Columns (1), (2) and (3) show results from the first regression step (eq. 1) in 
which we estimate the effect of (changes in) unemployment levels in the U.S. states where Mexican 
migrants live (Usempl) on return migration. We use these first step results from columns (1) to (3) to 
estimate second step results on turnout (eq. 2) in presidential elections in columns (4) to (6). Columns (1) 
and (4) are our baseline regressions for the first and second step. In order to highlight an effect of return 
migration as distinct from emigration and remittances effects, first step column (3) and second step column 
(6) include controls for the rates of out-migration (the share of households who reported emigrants over the 
previous five years) and the share of households who received remittances during the previous 12 months. 
These variables are available for the years 2000 and 2010 only. To make coefficients comparable, we also 
show the baseline results without the year 2005 in columns (2) and (4). All results include municipality 
fixed effects. This allows us to control for all variables that do not change over time (such as geographic 
differences, institutional legacies and migration histories). Heteroscedastic robust standard errors clustered 
at the municipal level are in brackets. 
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 The instrument has the expected sign and is strong: an increase in unemployment rates at 
destination is associated with more return migration.16 In addition, municipalities with a younger 
population, a higher ratio of households headed by men, a higher share of indigenous populations, and 
smaller municipalities received a larger number of returnees. Also, poorer states in terms of per capita GDP 
(gdppc) and municipalities with a higher effective number of parties (enp) had a higher inflow of returnees.  
 Our main interest lies in the second step coefficient of return migration in explaining voter turnout 
during presidential elections (columns (4) and (6)). Both coefficients are large in size and highly 
statistically significant. In terms of substantive effects, an increase in the share of return migration by one 
percentage point at the municipal level decreases expected turnout rates by 8 percentage points in 
presidential elections (column 5) and 11 percentage points when we include controls for emigration and 
remittances. The positive effect is confirmed (and even increases) when we include remittances and 
emigration controls. This makes us confident that the result is driven by return migration rather than by 
changes in remittances or out-migration rates. Appendix Table A2 shows results for the un-instrumented 
(biased) regression results. The coefficients have the same sign and are statistically significant, but smaller 
 
16 Weak instrument F statistics are above the conventional thresholds of 10 (Stock and Yogo 2002). 
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in magnitude.17 We observe a similar negative relationship between return migration and political 
participation in municipal elections (see Supplementary Appendix Table S2). 18 
 Regarding control variables, most behave as expected. More violence is associated with lower 
turnout rates, confirming previous findings (Trelles and Carreras 2012a; Ley 2018). A higher age of 
household heads is associated with lower turnout. In presidential elections, municipalities with lower 
education and more male-headed households had higher abstention rates. For the most part, worse 
socioeconomic conditions proxied in different ways correlate with lower turnout on Election Day. 
 
***Table 1: Effect of Return Migration on Voter Turnout, Presidential Elections. Instrumented Results*** 
 
 We now turn to the heterogeneity of the effect of return migration on electoral turnout. We argued 
that returning to contexts of violence and crime might affect returnees’ alienation and their probability of 
 
17 Although the exact sources of bias are unknown, one possibility is that worse economic or political 
contexts are associated with lower turnout rates, but also pose a dis-incentive to return. Some of these – for 
instance corruption and other abuses of political power, unreported violence or local economies of crime - 
are hard to capture using observable variables at the municipal level. In this case, the true effect of return 
migration would be underestimated. The fact that the substantive effect using municipal data is similar to 
that reported in previous research (Duquette-Rury and Chen 2018) reassures us of the validity of our 
identification strategy.  
18 Our results are robust to removing the controls for electoral competitiveness (Supplementary Appendix 
Table S1). When we measure turnout in local elections, the effect of return migration on turnout is 
insignificant in the second step regression once we exclude the year 2005. We attribute this to the difficulty 




contemplating repeated migration, in turn affecting their willingness to make political investments in their 
communities. Further, the portrayal of this cohort of returnees as failures as well as a threat, or even a 
cause of violence makes non-migrant co-nationals unlikely to consider these returnees as carriers of 
valuable norms. These two mechanisms are not exclusive and are likely to feed on each other. Both predict 
that the negative effect of return rates on turnout rates will be magnified when violence is rampant. In 
Table 2, we show the second step results, interacting return migration with different indicators of violence 
and crime. Column (1) shows the second step results for presidential elections, interacting return migration 
with the presence of cartels. Column (2) in turn uses the number of cartels present in a municipality rather 
than the presence of cartels as such, since rivalry between competing cartels has been a key explanation for 
escalating violence in Mexico (Shirk and Wallman 2015; Rios 2015). Column (3) reports results for an 
interaction between return migration and the log of drug-related sentences. Due to lack of data, we drop the 
year 2000 in the interacted regressions. As an instrument for the interactions, we interact the instrument 
Usempl with each of the three crime variables in the first step regression (see Table S3 in the 
Supplementary Appendix for first step results). The positive and statistically significant sign for the 
interaction terms in Table 2 suggests that as anticipated, a high number of returnees in the municipality 
adds to political alienation even more when migrants return to a context of crime and violence.19 We 
observe the same pattern for the case of turnout in municipal elections (see Supplementary Appendix Table 
S4). Overall, returnees disengage from electoral politics. The large substantive effects that we find in our 
data suggest that disenchantment with the political system, limited emigration opportunities, and high 
crime had spillover effects that affected communities’ electoral engagement overall. 
 
19 In line with Appendix Table A2, we observe the same sign but smaller coefficients for interactions that 
do not use instruments (see Appendix Table A3). 
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As an illustration, Figure 1 shows turnout rates predicted from an interaction between rates of 
return and the presence of cartels (column (1) in Table 2). The negative effect of return migration on 
abstention rates is heightened in contexts of crime and violence. To provide an example, the municipality 
of Calvillo in Aguascalientes registered a sizeable increase in the share of return migrants between 2005 
and 2010, from 1.3 to 5.3. Also, drug cartels were present in 2012. The predicted turnout rate in 
presidential elections in Calvillo is about 15% lower than if there had been no increase in return migration 
and no presence of cartels (and about 9% lower had there been the same rate of return but no presence of 
cartels).20  
 
 *** Table 2: Conditional Effect of Return Migration on Voter Turnout, Presidential Elections. 
Instrumented 2nd Step Results *** 
*** Figure 1: Effect of Return Migration on Voter Turnout During Presidential Elections, Conditional on 
the Presence of Cartels *** 
 
      
5. Discussion and Further Research 
Research on the political consequences of return migration in origin countries is in its infancy. And 
the scarce research that does exist is contradictory in its expectations and findings (Rother 2009; Batista 
and Vicente 2011; Chauvet and Mercier 2014; Pérez-Armendáriz 2014; Duquette-Rury and Chen 2018; 
 
20 Coefficients from Table 2 are not directly comparable to Table 1 because Table 2 covers the years 2005 
and 2010 only, while column (4) in Table 1 includes the year 2000. 
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Bucheli, Fontenla, and Waddell 2019). There is an optimistic camp that reports positive effects of return 
migration on the political life of communities via the transfer of norms and behaviours learned while 
abroad. However, research has so far overlooked the importance of the circumstances surrounding the act 
of returning, as well as the socio-political environment returnees encounter once they are back.  
 We start to unpack the political effects of return migration by making it explicit that context 
matters. In particular, we look at the return migration that followed the Great Recession and tightened 
migration and border policies in the U.S. This change in economic and political conditions in destination 
forced many migrants and their families to go back to their communities of origin, stigmatising their return 
as a failure (Hazan 2014; Pérez-Armendáriz 2014). Under these adverse circumstances, the necessary 
climate of trust that is a pre-requisite for social remittances to flow from returnees to their communities is 
unlikely to be present. Moreover, with security fast deteriorating in parallel, faltering interpersonal trust 
could only increase returnees’ and their communities’ perception of political inefficacy. Using a variety of 
indicators and specifications, we find that return migration is associated with lower participation in federal 
and local elections in Mexico. We also find that this effect is magnified in violent contexts, with 
substantive effects on electoral engagement. All in all, we do not find evidence of return migrants acting as 
drivers of electoral participation. 
 This research should be expanded and qualified on two fronts. First, we have confined ourselves to 
exploring the impact of return migration on election turnout, but this is obviously not the only mode of 
political engagement where returnees may become involved. Indeed, some studies have reported that those 
with a wide variety of migrant connections tend to disengage from electoral politics, but become more 
engaged in non-electoral political activities (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; Córdova and Hiskey 2015; 
Ley, Ibarra-Olivo, and Meseguer 2019; Pérez-Armendáriz and Duquette-Rury 2019). While research so far 
has focused on international connections such as receiving remittances or having emigrant relatives abroad, 
we claim that return migration might also be causally related with other non-electoral political activities, 
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including contentious violent politics. In violent democracies like Mexico, these behaviours may arguably 
be seen as more effective means of influencing politics than voting in elections.   
 And second, given the prominence of insecurity in Mexico, we decided to focus on the 
heterogeneous effects associated with the context of rampant insecurity that has been a feature of our 
research period; but there are other political and economic factors equally worth exploring, such as 
connections between return migration and political participation. The quality of sub-national institutions, 
the nature of political competition, or pre-existing levels of poverty are just some examples of variables 
worth looking at that might express the relationship between returnees and their role as agents of political 
and economic change. With increased restrictions on migration around the world, and return migration on 
the rise, exploring its political consequences in consolidating, often violent, democracies should be a 
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Table 1: Effect of Return Migration on Voter Turnout, Presidential Elections. Instrumented 
Regression Results  
  1st Step   2nd Step 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
  Return Migration   Turnout  
Usempl 0.042*** 0.034*** 0.025***         
[0.0042] [0.0042] [0.0042]         
Return         -0.066*** -0.082*** -0.11*** 
        [0.012] [0.023] [0.038] 
Emigration     -0.089***       -0.01** 
    [0.0073]       [0.0041] 
Remittances     0.042***       0.0042* 
    [0.0095]       [0.0025] 
Age -0.023*** -0.023 -0.026*   -0.0021 -0.0011 -0.0021 
[0.0087] [0.015] [0.014]   [0.0013] [0.0029] [0.0034] 
Education 0.001 0.018 -0.055   -0.0083* -0.0096 -0.017* 
[0.03] [0.044] [0.04]   [0.0045] [0.0084] [0.0097] 
Enp 0.097*** 0.071* 0.033   -0.0023 -0.012 -0.014 
[0.029] [0.039] [0.035]   [0.0041] [0.0081] [0.0088] 
Gdppc -2.7e-
05*** 
-6.00E-06 -1.1e-05**   -2.7e-
06*** 
-1.30E-06 -1.90E-06 
[4.7e-06] [5.5e-06] [5.2e-06]   [8.1e-07] [1.4e-06] [1.5e-06] 
Gdpshare 11** 3.6 10**   -0.0063 -0.56 0.29 
[4.6] [4.6] [4.2]   [0.56] [0.87] [0.97] 
Homicides (log) -0.019* -0.024 -0.019   -0.0025* -0.0068** -0.0071** 
[0.01] [0.017] [0.016]   [0.0013] [0.003] [0.0036] 
Indigenous 0.56** 0.61* -0.08   0.036 0.099 0.038 
[0.23] [0.34] [0.33]   [0.037] [0.067] [0.079] 
Male 1.7*** 2.1*** 0.069   0.19*** 0.29** 0.11 
[0.39] [0.64] [0.64]   [0.057] [0.13] [0.14] 







05** [1.9e-05] [2.2e-05] [2e-05]   [2.7e-06] [5.2e-06] [6e-06] 
Mun_Spending  -0.23*** -0.97*** -0.77***   -0.019* -0.09*** -0.098*** 
[0.07] [0.096] [0.093]   [0.011] [0.03] [0.035] 
Margin 2.20E-04 -1.20E-03 -8.10E-04   -8.20E-05 -6.80E-06 3.10E-06 
[0.001] [0.0014] [0.0013]   [0.00014] [0.00027] [0.00031] 
Population (log) -0.59*** -1.5*** -0.84***   -0.062** -0.14** -0.11** 
[0.13] [0.16] [0.13]   [0.03] [0.055] [0.056] 
(year)2005 0.0026       -0.05***     
[0.042]       [0.0065]     
(year)2010 1.1*** 1.3*** 1***   0.17*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 
[0.085] [0.11] [0.1]   [0.021] [0.044] [0.052] 
N 6016 3854 3854   6016 3854 3854 
years covered 2000/2005 
/2010 
2000/2010 2000/2010   2000/2005/ 
2010 
2000/2010 2000/2010 
R^2 0.57 0.64 0.7         
adj. R^2 0.29 0.14 0.27         
weak instr. F-Stat 
 
      208.98 80.65 49.71 
F-stat 231.2 145.06 167.21         
Statistical significance levels 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). All regressions include municipal and year 
fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in squared 
brackets. Partisanship controls are included for shares of each of the main parties during presidential 




Table 2: Conditional Effect of Return Migration on Voter Turnout, Presidential Elections. 
Instrumented 2nd Step Results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Turnout 
Return -0.022** -0.026** -0.022* 
[0.01] [0.011] [0.013] 
Return * Cartels -0.023***     
[0.007]     
Return * No. Cartels   -0.01*   
  [0.0057]   
Return * Sentenced     -0.0048*** 
    [0.0017] 
Cartels 0.032**     
[0.013]     
No. Cartels   0.0093   
  [0.0084]   
Sentences     0.0057** 
    [0.0028] 
partisanship controls Yes yes yes 
municipal fixed effects Yes yes yes 
year fixed effects Yes yes yes 
N 4251 4251 4251 
years covered 2005/2010 2005/2010 2005/2010 
weak F-stat 48.83 46.61 40.24 
weak F-stat (IA) 327.8 193.4 490.6 
Statistical significance levels 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Heteroscedasticity 
robust standard clustered at the municipal level in squared brackets. All 
regressions include the full set of time-varying controls as in Table 2. For details 




Table A1: Data Description (Municipality and State Level) 




Voter turnout in presidential elections (2000, 
2006, 2012) a) 
0.6 0.56 0.65 
[0.097] [0.099] [0.11] 
Turnout (local 
elections) 
Estimate of voter turnout in most recent 
municipal elections (share of total votes relative 
to the adult population) b) 
0.66 0.66 0.67 
[0.16] [0.15] [0.17] 
Return Share of the population who returned from abroad 
over the previous five years c) 
0.51 0.4 1.5 
[0.69] [0.56] [1.4] 
Usempl Indicator of exposure to change in unemployment 
rates in US states where Mexican migrants reside. 
For each Mexican state j, the share of its Diaspora 
D in destination states k is multiplied with 
changes in unemployment rates 𝑈 in state k over 
the previous three years, and summed up across 
all destinations K using the formula Usemplj =
 ∑ Uk
K
k=1 Dk,j. We multiply with historical 
migration rates at the level of US states and with 
inverse distance to the US border along historical 
rail lines to provide different weights at the level 
of municipalities (with municipalities closer to 
the border via historical rail lines receiving higher 
weights). See the data section for a detailed 
explanation d) 
-0.56 -0.59 3.5 
[0.88] [0.91] [5.5] 
Age Average age of household heads c) 47 48 50 
[3.9] [4.2] [3.9] 
Cartels Binary indicator whether drug cartels are 





Cartels No. Number of drug cartels operating in the 





Education Average years of schooling of the head of 
household c) 
4.7 5.1 5.6 
[1.6] [1.8] [1.8] 
Gdppc Per capita GDP at the level of Mexican states, in 
2005 USD i)  
6500 5600 7100 
[3200] [2700] [4500] 
Gdpsh States’ share in Mexican GDP i) 0.03 0.031 0.031 
[0.028] [0.027] [0.025] 
Homicides 
(log) 
Log of annual homicides per 100,000 inhabitants 
i) 
1.6 1.5 1.8 
[1.6] [1.5] [1.7] 
Indigenous Share of persons in the municipality who speak 
an indigenous language i) 
0.2 0.19 0.19 
[0.33] [0.32] [0.31] 
Male Share of households in the municipality whose 
head is male i) 
0.81 0.79 0.78 
[0.059] [0.068] [0.055] 
Maginality Aggregate indicator of social deprivation 
(“rezago social”) based on deficiencies in 
educational achievements, access to health 
services, and living conditions f) 
-0.0049 -0.01 -0.0025 
[1] [0.99] [1] 
Mun_spending Annual per capita expenditures of municipal 
governments (in constant 2010 Mexican Pesos) i) 
1100 2200 3600 





Log of the population size of municipality c) 9.3 9.3 9.4 
[1.5] [1.5] [1.6] 
Sentenced 
(log) 
Log of drug-related sentences per 100,000 





Emigration  Share of households reporting emigrants over the 







Remittances Share of households having received international 







Last Election Years since last municipal election took place b) 0.32 0.11 0.55 
[0.47] [0.32] [0.5] 
Enp (pres. 
election) 
Effective number of parties in latest federal 
election e) 
2.4 2.7 3 
[0.44] [0.68] [0.79] 
Enp (local 
election) 
Effective number of parties in latest local election 
e) 
2.5 2.7 2.8 
[0.66] [0.74] [0.79] 
Margin (local 
election) 
Margin of victory in latest local election e) 23 22 20 
[19] [17] [16] 
Margin (pres. 
election) 
Margin of victory in presidential elections (2000, 
2006, 2012) e) 
18 12 12 
[18] [11] [12] 
PAN (pres. 
election) 
Share of votes for PAN in federal elections (2000, 
2006, 2012) a) 
0.27 0.28 0.24 
[0.16] [0.15] [0.12] 
PAN (state) Binary indicator whether state was governed by 
PAN b) 
0.17 0.21 0.44 
[0.38] [0.41] [0.5] 
PAN (local 
election) 
Shares of votes for PAN during the most recent 
municipal election (either alone or as coalition) b) 
0.22 0.28 0.33 
[0.18] [0.18] [0.18] 
PRD (pres. 
election) 
Share of votes for PRD in federal elections (2000, 
2006, 2012) a) 
0.2 0.34 0.2 
[0.14] [0.16] [0.12] 
PRD (state) Binary indicator whether state was governed by 
PRD b) 
0.085 0.16 0.49 
[0.28] [0.37] [0.5] 
PRD (local 
election) 
Shares of votes for PRD during the most recent 
municipal election (either alone or as coalition) b) 
0.2 0.21 0.19 
[0.17] [0.18] [0.18] 
PRI (pres. 
election) 
Share of votes for PRI in federal elections (2000, 
2006, 2012) a) 
0.48 0.32 0.4 
[0.14] [0.12] [0.11] 
PRI (state) Binary indicator whether state was governed by 
PRI b) 
0.8 0.53 0.35 
[0.4] [0.5] [0.48] 
PRI (local 
election) 
Shares of votes for PRI during the most recent 
municipal election (either alone or as coalition) b) 
0.47 0.43 0.39 
[0.15] [0.13] [0.18] 
The table reports mean values, standard deviations in square brackets for up to 2443 municipalities. Sources: a) Instituto 
Nacional Electoral (INE), b) CIDAC (2016), c) INEGI data based on 2000 and 2010 censuses and 2005 population count, d) 
USBLS (2014), IME (2008) and Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2011), e) Ley (2018), f) CONEVAL (2017), g) Ríos and Coscia 2012, h) 





Table A2: Return Migration and Voter Turnout During Presidential Elections. Uninstrumented 
OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Turnout (pres.) 
Return -0.0034*** -0.0046** -0.0043* 
[0.0012] [0.0021] [0.0025] 
Emigration 
  




-0.00013   
[0.00061] 
time-varying controls yes yes yes 
municipal fixed effects yes yes yes 
year fixed effects yes yes yes 
N 6019 3857 3857 
years covered 2000/20005/2010 2000/2010 2000/2010 
R^2 0.47 0.37 0.37 
F-stat 155.38 47.56 43.19 
Statistical significance levels 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in squared brackets. 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard in squared brackets. Turnout refers to presidential 
elections held in 2000, 2006 and 2012. All regressions include the full set of time-
varying controls as in Table 1. For details see text and data description. For details 






Table A3: Return Migration on Voter Turnout, Conditional on Crime and Violence. 
Uninstrumented OLS 
  Turnout (pres.) 
Return 0.001 -0.00041 0.0018 
[0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0014] 
Return * Cartels -0.0048***     
[0.0018]     
Return * Nr. Cartels   -0.00042   
  [0.00091]   
Return * Sentenced     -0.002*** 
    [0.00054] 
Cartels 0.0036     
[0.0049]     
Nr. Cartels   -0.0046**   
  [0.002]   
Sentences     0.0028** 
    [0.0013] 
partisanship controls yes yes yes 
municipal fixed effects yes yes yes 
year fixed effects yes yes yes 
N 4254 4254 4254 
years covered 2000/2010 2000/2005/2010 2000/2010 
R^2 0.7 0.7 0.7 
F-stat 205.46 206.41 206.3 
Statistical significance levels 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in 
squared brackets. Turnout refers to presidential elections held in 2000, 2006 and 
2012. All regressions include the full set of time-varying controls as in Table 1. 
For details see text and data description. 
 
 
 
